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AMTRAK: RAIL RENAISSANCE OR REQUIEM?
WILLIAM E. THOMS*
I. DECLINE AND FALL
F OR ONE HALF-CENTURY, the American passenger train has been in an
accelerating stage of decline. In the early twenties the river steamers
had vanished, the bus had not emerged, automobiles were an urban
luxury of questionable reliability, and the airplane was still an ex-
perimental novelty. Reliance on railroads for transport of passengers
was as great as reliance on the private automobile today.
Transportation was carried out directly by private railroad cor-
porations on a for-profit basis. The conditions of a free market never
were perfectly apparent in these operations, since fares, schedules, and
frequency of service were subject to the authority of various state regu-
latory bodies and of the Interstate Commerce Commission. But private
ownership and comparative lack of subsidy were hallmarks of American
rail passenger transportation, which distinguished it from the majority
of Western nations. Elsewhere, government ownership was the rule, with
some exceptions such as the privately-owned Canadian Pacific Railway.
Railroad corporations operated under charters received from the
states, some of which required that the corporation must be organized
under the laws of the jurisdictions through which it operated. These
charters usually vested the railroad with a public mission and some pub-
lic responsibility. Railroads were chartered to carry passengers and
freight, for which they were incidentally permitted to charge fares.
Independent ownership and operation of railroad passenger trains
continued until May 1, 1971, when most operations were taken over by
the newly chartered National Rail Passenger Corporation, AMTRAK.
Whether this new corporation will prove to be the beginning of the re-
surgence of rail transportation or merely a device by which railroads
are able to avoid their common-carrier responsibilities remains to be
seen. This article will describe the effect of the Rail Passenger Service
* B.A., Colgate University 1961; J.D., Yale University 1964; M.C.L., Tulane University
1971. Member of District of Columbia and Louisiana bars. Assistant Professor of Law, IIT/
Chicago-Kent College of Law. This piece is adapted from Reprieve for the Iron Horse, copy.
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Act of 1970,1 which authorized AMTRAK's creation and established a
new relationship between the Interstate Commerce Commission, Depart-
ment of Transportation, state regulatory agencies, and carriers by rail.
The decline of railroad passenger service is a familiar story.2 The
automobile has replaced all other vehicles as the dominant mode of
transport. Much of this change is due to the inherent or supposed ad-
vantages of the personal car; some of this change is due to the lack of
alternate transportation, especially in suburban and rural areas. Within
the common-carrier market, railroads have lost patronage to the airplane
and intercity bus. This loss has occurred even in markets not suited for
other carriers, this fact giving some credence to the belief that the rail-
roads, intent on concentration on the carload freight traffic, have either
let other facilities wither or have actually discouraged use of their trains
for travel. The resulting loss occurs when facilities are allowed to be-
come so decrepit and inconvenient that anyone with good sense will
avoid them; sometimes this result occurs when schedule and connection
changes are made; and sometimes it occurs when rail travel is priced
out of the market. Representative Abner Mikva (D-Ill) remarked about
a recent fare raise by the Illinois Central:
They are going to put up the fares so high that no one will ride ....
Then, like the guy who killed both his parents and pleaded for mercy
because he was an orphan, they are going to come in and ask to dis-
continue the service.3
In some cases passenger trains were also used to carry preferential
commodities, such as mail, milk, express shipments, perishable freight
and newspapers. Diversion of these items to other modes of travel has
affected passenger service. Closer scrutiny reveals that high-speed con-
tainer or piggyback freight trains now carry these commodities and that
in many cases mail has been removed from passenger trains at the
insistence of railroads themselves, who then handled the shipments in
fast freight trains Many of these changes may well be natural develop-
ments in view of cost and convenience. However, while the railroads
produced 39.5 billion passenger-miles in 1926, in 1956 the figure fell
to 28.3 billion.5
I Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327 (1970).
2 See generally P. Lyon, To Hell in a Day Coach (1968).
3 Quoted in Southerland, The Need to Revive Passenger Rail Service, Princeton Alumni
Weekly 32 (Dec. 15, 1970).
4 Lyon, Is this Any Way to Ruin a Railroad?, Am. Heritage 55 (Feb. 1968).
5 G. Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958 11 (1969).
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At present, the United States trails the industrialized world in
providing rail passenger service. Britain has 1,000 intercity passenger
trains; France 350; West Germany 527; and the United States, prior to
operation by AMTRAK, less than 400. Meanwhile, all highways in the
United States now equal the combined land area of the states of Con-
necticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and
Vermont.6 However, the major cities in these same European nations
are closer together than the non-coastal American cities. The United
States has more rationale for reliance on domestic air carriage. Public
policies in this country have favored construction of highways, such as
the Interstate system, which encourage use of cars and intercity buses.
In terms of capacity and efficiency, the passenger train is still
unexcelled for mass movements of people. This natural efficiency, how-
ever, has been artificially weakened by the unhealthy labor climate on
the railroads. Faced with declining membership and what they believe
to be management's disregard for safety in an industry in retrenchment,
the operating unions have strived for as full employment as possible,
although the average wage of a railway worker, compared to his counter-
part in industry, is not overly great. Pay is based on a complex formula
of miles and hours, which penalizes the junior brakeman on long, slow
freights and work trains, and rewards the senior conductor on the pas-
senger limiteds.
Railroads are not unique in their labor problems. Competing
modes of transportation are faced not only with rising labor costs, but
also with excess operating personnel. Many airliners must operate with
a cockpit crew of three, although the necessity for the flight engineer
is debatable. In addition, the service requirements of airlines demand a
large number of cabin and ground personnel to look after the pas-
senger's well-being. Although the intercity bus is operated by one man,
his maximum productivity is about 45 fares. In addition, terminal
services for bus travel are often more extensive than those now provided
by our more decrepit railroads. However, airports and bus terminals
are more efficiently operated than most railroad stations. Railroad
officials are nearly unanimous in citing rising labor and terminal costs
as the main reason for the unprofitability of passenger trains.
When speaking of rail passenger service, we are really speaking of
6 Supra n.3, at 35-36.
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several different types of train operations, which are classified by the
Interstate Commerce Commission as follows:
1. Short-haul or commuter service in metropolitan, suburban, and
other areas for distances of 75 miles or less;
2. Medium-distance service between 75 and 300 miles in high-density
population corridors;
3. Non-corridor medium distance service; and
4. Long-haul service.7
Medium-distance corridor service is the area where most observers
believe the future of rail passenger service lies. The two high-speed
services operated by the Penn Central, the "Metroliner" between New
York and Washington and the "Turbotrain" between New York and
Boston, fit into this category. For such distances, rail service can be
cheaper and competitive with air travel, if access time to airports is
included.
Due to mergers and discontinuances of service, the rail passenger
burden had become unevenly distributed by 1970. Three-quarters of all
passenger trains in the country, and the majority of the intercity trains,
were operated by the now bankrupt Penn Central, itself the culmination
of a giant merger of the three largest passenger carriers in the country.
On the other hand, the competing Norfolk & Western system operated
only ten passenger trains, two of which were commuter trains in the
Chicago area. Furthermore, some large Class I railroads, such as the
Lehigh Valley, Kansas City Southern, Western Pacific and Cotton Belt,
had managed to divest themselves of the passenger burden altogether.
Historically, regulation of railroad passenger service had been
primarily a concern of the states, and the general jurisdiction over its
discontinuance was not shared with the federal government until 1958.
In the absence of any positive duty to operate passenger service imposed
by charter or statute, approval of discontinuance was based on a weigh-
ing of the financial burden to the railroad against elements of public
convenience and necessity. In this adjudicative process, the burden of
proof was usually upon the carrier.'
As a result of the enactment of Section 13a of the Interstate Coin-
7 ICC, Intercity Rail Passenger Service in 1968.
8 See generally Bard, The Challenge of Rail Passenger Service, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 301
(1967) ; Thomas, Public Utilities: Discontinuance of Railroad Service, 14 Rutgers L. Rev.
345 (1960).
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merce Act in 1958,' all total abandonments and discontinuances of
passenger trains by carriers operating in interstate commerce were made
subject to at least the concurrent jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. This section was part of a package of reforms for the
railroad industry entitled the "Transportation Act of 1958."1" Congress
desired to strengthen the financial health of the railroads by allowing
them, at their option, to have the ICC, rather than state commissions,
pass upon the discontinuance or change in the operation of any pas-
senger train.11 During the twelve years in which the Commission had
jurisdiction over passenger trains, over one thousand intercity trains
were discontinued, leaving a mere 360 trains, compared with some
20,000 in 1929.12 The Commission still maintains some authority over
discontinuance of short-haul and commuter trains13 (AMTRAK trains
in the basic system)14 and will regain jurisdiction over discontinuances
by non-AMTRAK railroads in 1975."5
II. THE RAIL PASSENGER SERVICE ACT OF 1970
Railpax, later called AMTRAK, was an idea whose time had come.
The concept that the railroads themselves had discouraged passengers
had been met with a great following. Concern over the environment and
the effects of superhighways upon urban centers had become a political
cause celebre. By 1970, some airlines were losing money, retrenching
financially, and reducing levels of service. They suffered from a com-
bination of seating overcapacity and failure to anticipate a leveling off
of business travel due to economic woes. Airlines were especially anx-
ious to leave the short-haul market, where high terminal costs ate up
most passenger revenues. Only the intercity bus companies were showing
a profit. The success of the "Metroliner," and of fast trains in such
countries as France, Germany, and Japan had led many people to be-
lieve that service could be improved only if rail management were kept
away from passenger service.
9 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. § 13a (1958).
10 72 Stat. 568, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1231-40 (1958).
11 See generally G. Hilton, The Transportation Act of 1958 (1969).
12 Wall St. J., Oct. 16, 1970, at 2, col. 2; see also ICC, Intercity Rail Passenger Service
in 1968 at 1-2; Thorns and Laird, Derailing the Passenger, 36 ICC Prac. J. 1118 (1968)
Laird and Thorns, End of the Line, 15 Loyola L. Rev. 263 (1969).
13 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1328 § 102(5) (1970).
14 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1336 § 404(b) (3) (1970).
15 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1336 § 404(a) (1970).
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Proposals for rail passenger assistance took four main forms: (1)
nationalization of the railroads; (2) establishment of a public corpo-
ration for nationalization of passenger service only; (3) adoption of a
modification of the Canadian subsidy plan by which railroads would be
compensated for some or all of their losses connected with operation
of unprofitable trains;' 6 and (4) the establishment of specific federal
grants to refurbish equipment and facilities or to purchase new equip-
ment. Some members of Congress and the administration believed that
this problem was best left to states or regions of the country. By April
of 1970, the Senate was considering general subsidy legislation with a
price tag of $435 million.17
As far back as 1961, the Doyle Report' s had proposed a National
Rail Passenger Service Corporation along the lines of the Pullman
Company, but with joint public-private ownership. The idea of "Rail-
pax" (the telegraphic symbol for "railroad passenger"), a government
sponsored, though private, corporation, is credited to Professor Paul
Cherington of M.I.T., a well-known student of transportation problems,
who served as assistant secretary of transportation for policy develop-
ment in the Johnson Administration, and since 1970 has been a trustee
in bankruptcy of the Boston & Maine Railroad. 9 John Burby, who
served as special assistant to the Secretary of Transportation Alan Boyd,
states that the Cherington plan was first described in a speech delivered
in Arizona before a group of railroad executives in 1968 by Richard
J. Barber, then deputy assistant secretary for policy development.20
The Cherington plan appeared to be lost somewhere in the bureau-
cracy by the winter of 1969-70. Pressure from lobbyists caused Secre-
tary of Transportation John Volpe to introduce a modification of the
Railpax scheme. Debate was brief, and Volpe's bill passed the Senate
on May 6, 1970, by a vote of 78-3. The legislation had the support of
The National Association of Railroad Passengers, the Railway Labor
Executives' Association, the Association of American Railroads, and
the Department of Transportation.
16 14-15-16 Eliz. II, Chapter 69 (1966-67).
17 S. 3706 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
18 S. Commerce Comm., National Transportation Policy Report (by its Special Study
Group on Transportation Policies in the United States) (June 26, 1961).
19 Passenger Train J. 20 (Fall 1970).
20 J. Burby, The Great American Motion Sickness 181-82 (1971).
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Action in the House was not as speedy. Senate action had been
accelerated by public pressure resulting from the attempt of the mori-
bund Penn Central to strand all its east-west passengers.2 Penn Central's
petition had lumped money-losing trains together with such flagships
as the "Broadway Limited," which by Penn Central's own accounting
had turned a profit in 1968.
But in June, the House was faced with the Penn Central bankruptcy,
and the Railpax bill was held up pending an investigation of the finan-
cial finagling involved there. In the meantime, some railroads which
were down to their last two or three passenger trains and hoped the ICC
would let them make their quietus peacefully in the next year or two
saw an opportunity in the delay to kill the Railpax bill and achieve a
final solution of the passenger question. These railroads wrought an
amendment which would give those railroads which refused to accept
Railpax common stock a tax write-off for the entrance fees paid to the
Railpax Corporation, as an extraordinary business expense.22
On October 7, 1970, the House Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce reported the Railpax bill favorably to the House.
Funding was increased; the outright grant of $40 million for general
and specific subsidies was retained, but the Senate figures of $60 million
in loan guarantees for capital improvements of the new corporation and
$75 million for railroads which needed the money to buy into it were
raised to $100 and $200 million respectively, bringing the total cost
of the legislation to $340 million. Finally, the railroads joining the
corporation would receive a tax deduction of the full amount of their
payment to Railpax as a necessary business expense.23 The beginning
date for Railpax was delayed from March 1 to May 1, 1971; and the
date when trains within the basic network could be dropped was changed
from January, 1975, to July, 1973.
On October 14, 1971, the bill passed the House unanimously by
voice vote on the motion of Commerce Committee chairman Harley
Staggers (D-W.Va.). That same afternoon, Acting Majority Leader
Robert C. Byrd (D-W.Va.) moved that the Senate approve the House
version. The motion passed without objection.
21 Penn Central Transp. Co.-Discontinuance of 34 Passenger Trains, ICC Finance
Docket 26106, (1970).
22 Supra n.20.
23 Id. at 21.
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The Congress then adjourned for elections. However, the Council
of Economic Advisers, the Office of Management and Budget, and some
high White House staff men counseled against the corporation plan as
a waste of money. Reportedly this advice gave President Nixon some
cause for hesitating before signing the bill, but Secretary Volpe and the
lobbies which had supported the bill rallied another show of support
and the President, facing Congressional elections, signed the bill on
Friday, October 30.24
The new legislation contains several curious features and more
than one ambiguity. Title I concerns itself with findings, purposes and
definitions. The "Findings and Declaration of Purpose" read, in part,
as follows:
The Congress finds that . . . public convenience and necessity require
the continuance and improvement of such [railroad passenger] service
to provide fast and comfortable transportation between crowded urban
areas and in other areas of the country; that rail passenger service can
help to end the congestion on our highways and the overcrowding of
airways and airports .... 25
The act is meant to preserve and improve intercity passenger
service, but the definition given for such service is highly ambiguous:
'Intercity rail passenger service' means all rail passenger service other
than (A) commuter and other short-haul service in metropolitan and
suburban areas, usually characterized by reduced fare, multiple-ride
and commutation tickets, and by morning and evening peak period
operations, and (B) auto-ferry service characterized by transportation
of automobiles and their occupants where contracts for such service
have been consummated prior to enactment of this Act.26
The Senate report clarifies that this section was intended to exclude
commuter service, which might be eligible for assistance under the
urban Mass Transportation Act.27 However, this exclusion was not made
sufficiently clear in the House version. As a result, litigation has ensued
concerning this definition.28
"Rail passenger service" seems to mean "passenger train service"
rather than "passenger service operated by railroads." Railroad-
24 Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
25 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1328, § 101 (1970).
26 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1328, § 102(5) (1970).
27 49 U.S.C. § 1601 (1970).
28 Illinois Commerce Commission v. Chicago & Eastern Illinois Railroad Co., - U.S.
-, Docket Nos. 137 and 138; City of Philadelphia v. Baker, Civil No. 71-1002 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
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operated service by water or highway was not discussed in the Congres-
sional debates, and at best is a limited problem since railroads were not
allowed to diversify except for certain "grandfather rights" obtained
before 1935. The exceptions are not very well defined: sub-paragraph
(A) definitely exempts commuter trains, but the meaning of "other
short-haul service" and the extent of a commuter zone is unclear. The
short-haul service must be in metropolitan and suburban areas, but the
other commuter criteria need not apply. The Act does not state who de-
termines if an exclusion from the Act's provision should be made.
Trains not operating in metropolitan and suburban areas are in-
cluded in the "intercity" classification, despite the fact that many trains
which offer passenger service are short-line or mixed train operations
with no connection with intercity runs. The law affects the Santa Fe's
"Super Chief" between Chicago and Los Angeles equally with the
California Western's "Super Skunk" between the towns of Willits and
Fort Bragg in California.29
The exclusion in Section 102(5) (B) seems to apply to the pro-
jected auto-train service contemplated by the Office of High Speed
Ground Transportation. The exclusion is restricted to cases where con-
tracts "have already been consummated prior to enactment" and thus
is not applicable to the new Auto-Train Corporation.
The term "avoidable costs" found in Section 102(6) is apparently
connected with the ICC's study of the passenger service costs of eight
railroads in 1969. Since this figure is not regularly reported in ICC's
accounting procedures, a substantial revision of carrier accounting
requirements might be necessary if the ICC is to be able to successfully
determine such costs." The ICC used the term "net avoidable costs"
in its 1969 study, which contemplated a number of accounting con-
siderations, including a comparison of sacrificed revenues with avoid-
able costs. "Net avoidable costs" was used as a measure of how much
better off a carrier would have been in a stated period had it operated no
passenger service. However, the Act refers to both "avoidable loss" and
29 The General Counsel of the California Western is of the opinion that, since the cor-
poration's passenger trains operate only within California, they are solely subject to the
jurisdiction of the California Public Utilities Commission. Letter to author from Robert A.
Elliott, Assistant General Counsel, California Western R.R., July 28, 1971.
30 Harbeson, The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, 38 ICC Prac. J. 330, 338 (1971).
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"avoidable costs."3 1 "Avoidable loss" is defined as "the avoidable costs
of providing passenger service, less revenues attributable thereto, as
determined by the Interstate Commerce Commission."32
Title II of the Act authorized the Secretary of Transportation to
recommend a basic national railroad passenger system, identifying end
points between which service shall be provided and the routes over which
trains may be operated. The statutory criteria for designation of this
system are:
[O]pportunities for provision of faster service, more convenient ser-
vice, service to more centers of population, and service at lower cost,
by the joint operation, for passenger service, of facilities of two or
more railroad companies; the importance of a given service to overall
viability of the basic system; adequacy of other transportation facilities
serving the same points; unique characteristics of rail service as com-
pared to other modes of transportation; the relationship of public bene-
fits of given services to the costs of providing such services; and po-
tential profitability of the service.
33
The familiar criterion of public convenience and necessity have ap-
parently fallen by the wayside.
The Secretary's recommendations are to be submitted within 30
days of enactment of the Rail Passenger Service Act. The ICC, state
agencies, railroads and labor unions are given thirty days to present
their views and comments before the Secretary of Transportation is
required to file his final recommendations, which are not reviewable
in any court of law, within 90 days after enactment of the legislation.
The heart of the legislation is Title III which creates a National
Railroad Passenger Corporation. This entity
shall be a for-profit corporation, the purpose of which shall be to pro-
vide intercity rail passenger service, employing innovative operating
and marketing concepts so as to fully develop the potential of modern
rail service in meeting the nation's intercity passenger transportation
requirements. The Corporation will not be an agency or establishment
of the United States Government. 34
The last sentence was added to show that the subsidy approach may be
abandoned and that the federal government is not going to nationalize
the railroads-yet.
31 Letter from George M. Stafford, ICC Chairman, to Wilfred Rommel, Assistant Di-
rector for Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, Feb. 3, 1970.
32 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1327, § 102(6) (1970).
33 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1329, § 201 (1970).
34 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1330, § 301 (1970).
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The establishment of a non-public corporation was for limited
purposes. Professor Robert W. Harbeson of the University of Illinois
Department of Economics suggests that:
If NRPC had been established as a public corporation, rail passenger
service property contributed to the Corporation would have been re-
moved from state and local tax rolls. The necessity of reimbursing state
and local governments for the loss of tax revenue would consequently
have become an issue.35
The incorporators are appointed by the President of the United
States with the advice and consent of the Senate. They serve for 180
days after enactment. The Corporation has fifteen directors, eight ap-
pointed by the President, one of whom must be the Secretary of Trans-
portation and another of whom must be a "consumer representative."
A "consumer representative" is a unique requirement for a public
corporation, reflecting the recent strength of the consumer movement.
However, the act does not specify that the "consumer representative"
had to be a "passenger representative," so the term was so vague as to
be meaningless. Everyone, after all, is a consumer.
None of the presidential appointees may have any direct or indirect
financial or employment relationship with any railroad during the time
that he serves on the board. Three members of the board are to be
elected by participating railroads and four by preferred stockholders.
No stock will be held by the Government, which, however, will con-
tribute grants and loans.
The financing arrangements were described by a financial writer
as follows:
The railroads, you see, can get their unprofitable trains off their own
books by buying common stock in the passenger corporation. If the
roads decline to go through this maneuver, they must continue running
their trains until at least 1975. That's one way to sell stock.
When it comes to raising other capital, the corporation has no such
sales tool. It will have a high-level financial panel, which will have to
come up with some clever plans to draw investors into an enterprise
with bleak prospects.36
AMTRAK has no immediate plans to issue preferred stocks (stock to be
sold to the general public but not to railroads) until its financial pros-
pects improve."1
35 Supra n.30, at 337.
36 Clark, Rail Passenger Corporation: Exercise in Futility? Wall St. J. May 8, 1970.
37 Interview with Director David Bradshaw, Chicago, May 5, 1971.
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The Corporation is authorized to own and operate passenger trains,
or to contract for their operation, and also to carry mail and express."
No specification is made as to what rates are to be charged for use of
facilities, since this topic is subject to contracts between NRPC and
the railroads. In case of failure to agree on terms, the ICC shall set
contract provisions.
The Corporation is considered a common carrier by railroad and
is subject to all provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act except for
regulation of fares, abandonment of trackage and discontinuance under
Section 13a, with certain exceptions provided in the Act. This provision
permits the Corporation to set its own rates and to institute, change, or
discontinue service except that which is in the "basic system" and that
which is subsidized by the states without going through any regulatory
process.
3 9
If the Corporation or a railroad engages in any act or policy in-
consistent with the policy of the Act, the Attorney General of the United
States may bring an action for equitable relief in any United States
District Court.4"
The Corporation is subject to the same safety regulations as a
railroad and the same laws with respect to collective bargaining with
employees. In view of the prevalent dissatisfaction with the Railway
Labor Act and the high labor costs which result from perpetuation of
certain work rules and crew standards, this provision seems to militate
against any great savings in costs of operation for the Corporation. Any
employee or employee representative may bring action against the Cor-
poration for violation of a labor agreement.41
The Corporation is exempted from any state or other law pertinent
to rail passenger service, and persons contracting with the Corporation
for joint use or operation of facilities necessary for passenger service
are exempted from the prohibitions of the antitrust laws.42 The Corpo.
ration must submit annual recommendations to the President and Con-
gress for amendments to the law, including the need for financial
38 Pub. L No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1332, § 305 (1970).
39 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1332, § 306(a) (1970).
40 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1333, § 307(a) (1970).
41 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1333, § 307(a) (1970).
42 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1333, § 306 (1970).
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assistance. In addition, the Secretary of Transportation and the ICC
must submit biennial reports on the state of rail passenger service and
the effectiveness of this law in meeting the requirements for a balanced
national transportation system, together with any legislative recom-
mendations.4"
The essence of the Act is the "carrot and stick" provisions con-
cerning assumption of passenger service by the Corporation in Title IV.
The law provides that on or before May 1, 1971, or during the period
from March 1, 1973, to January 1, 1975, the Corporation is authorized
to contract; and upon written request from any railroad, must tender a
contract to relieve the railroad from all responsibility for providing
intercity rail passenger service.
Railroads discontinuing trains under this provision must observe
the notice provisions contained in Section 13a(1) of the Interstate Com-
merce Act.44 In consideration for being relieved of responsibility for
operating these trains, the railroad must pay NRPC one of the following
amounts: (1) 50 percent of its fully-distributed passenger service deficit
for 1969; (2) 100 percent of the avoidable loss on all intercity pas-
senger service rendered by it in 1969; or (3) 200 percent of the avoid-
able loss on intercity service provided between points on the basic
national rail passenger system in 1969. The amount due must be paid
over a three-year period in cash, or at NRPC's option, by a transfer of
equipment or provision of future service.45 Disputes as to the amount
owed are to be resolved by the ICC. The accounting is based on figures
supplied to the ICC by the railroads in 1969. This provision means
that if a railroad overstated its passenger losses to the ICC, it has a
higher entrance fee to pay NRPC. The fact that a railroad is not operat-
ing over the NRPC route segments does not mean it can discontinue
service without paying an entrance fee to the Corporation. In exchange
for the payment, the carrier may receive common stock of NRPC; but
if the railroad waives its claim to stock, the payment may be treated as
a tax-deductible expense.4"
On May 1, 1971, the Corporation was required to begin providing
43 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1333, § 308 (1970).
44 72 Stat. 571, 49 U.S.C. 13a(1) (1958).
45 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1332, § 401(a) (2-3) (1970).
46 See H.R. Rep. No. 91-1580 at 12-14 (1970).
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intercity rail passenger service unless such service is being performed
by a non-contracting railroad or by a regional transportation agency
which has given satisfactory assurance of its willingness or ability to
cooperate with NRPC. No railroad may operate over any route on which
the Corporation operates without NRPC's permission.47 The ICC can
force a recalcitrant railroad to let NRPC operate its trains over the
railroad's tracks.4 Combined with freedom from fare, service, and
anti-trust regulation, this provision makes the new Corporation a very
tight monopoly. Section 402(b) provides:
To facilitate the initiation of operations by the Corporation within the
basic system, the Commission shall, upon application by the Corpora-
tion, require a railroad to make immediately available tracks and other
facilities. The Commission shall immediately thereafter promptly pro-
ceed to fix such terms and conditions as are just and reasonable. 49
The Commission has broad discretion in fixing terms and conditions
since no statutory criterion is given.
Section 403 is the "put up or shut up" section. It authorizes the
Corporation to provide additional trains, including special and excur-
sion trains, if consistent with prudent management. Where additional
service is provided for two years, that service shall be considered part
of the basic system. A state, regional or local agency may request
additional service, which NRPC must provide if the requesting author-
ity agrees to reimburse the Corporation two thirds of the attributable
losses incurred by the system. If the agency and NRPC are unable to
agree, the matter is referred to the Secretary of Transportation for de-
termination." This section for the first time fixes responsibility for
subsidizing local service with local authorities, and it may have an
effect on the taxation of passenger facilities by state and local govern-
ments. A "regional transportation agency" is defined as "an authority,
corporation, or other entity established for the purpose of providing
passenger service within a region." In nebulous wording, the legislation
encourages the widest range of public or private participation."
Service not included within the basic system may be dropped by
NRPC at any time. However, unless a railroad has entered into a con-
47 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1335, § 40 1 (c) (1970).
48 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1335, § 402(a) (1970).
49 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1335, § 402(b) (1970).
5O Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1335-36, § 403 (1970).
51 See Passenger Train J. (Spring 1971).
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tract with NRPC, it may not discontinue any intercity passenger service
whatsoever prior to January 1, 1975. After that date, passenger inter-
city trains may be discontinued under Section 13a of the Interstate
Commerce Act.
Section 405 provides that the railroads or the Corporation shall
protect the interests of employees affected by discontinuance of pas-
senger service. All such discontinuances are subject to protective labor
conditions no less favorable than those provided by the Interstate Com-
merce Act in connection with railroad mergers.52
Title V directs the President to appoint a fifteen-man financial
advisory panel to advise the Corporation on methods of increasing its
capitalization. Six members shall represent investment banking, com-
mercial banking, and rail transportation; two members shall represent
the Secretary of the Treasury; and seven members shall represent the
public in the various regions of the nation.5"
Titles VI and VII provide for federal financial assistance. A sum
of $40 million is authorized (to be available until spent) to organize
and to meet the operating costs of the Corporation, to establish an
improved reservation system (this provision was necessary to avoid
one of the grievances against the railroads, the lack of a coordinated
reservation scheme)," to advertise, to maintain passenger equipment,
to conduct research and development, and to maintain fixed facilities
for operation of basic system service where none presently exist.55 This
grant appears to be both a general and specific subsidy.
The Secretary of Transportation is authorized to guarantee loans
to the Corporation of $100 million for new rolling stock, upgrading of
roadbeds, and other corporate purposes. The Secretary is also authorized
to make loans or to guarantee loans (totalling $200 million outstanding
at any one time) to railroads to enable them to perform contracts under
the Act. Such loans must be necessary and related to matters involved in
the legislation.56 Most financial experts think that this amount of gov-
52 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1337, § 405 (1970).
53 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1338, §§ 501-03 (1970).
54 Only the Penn Central and the Burlington Northern maintained computerized reserva-
tion systems, and those only for some trains.
55 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1338, § 601 (1970).
56 T. McCardell, The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Public Law 91-518 8 (Lib.
Cong. Leg. Ref. Bureau 1970).
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ernment financing, $340 million in all, is insufficient and that the sale
of preferred stock will be difficult at best. Also, most of the carriers'
payments to NRPC will probably be in the form of equipment and
services rather than in cash, even though acceptance of payments in
kind depends on the discretion of the Corporation.57 Considering the
amounts allowed for highway and airway subsidy and development,
$340 million seems niggardly indeed.5"
In Section 801, the ICC is granted the power to prescribe such
regulations as it considers necessary to provide safe and adequate ser-
vice, equipment, and facilities for intercity rail passenger service. Any
person who violates such a regulation can be fined up to $500 per day
for each violation.59 The fact that "any person" is used rather than "the
Corporation" indicates that the ICC now has jurisdiction over all inter-
city passenger trains, be they operated by NRPC or others. Thus, the
passenger finally has a stronger remedy than the essentially negative
procedure of requiring a railroad to continue operating an inadequate
service.
Section 802 established a moratorium on all intercity train dis-
continuances, which was effective from October 30, 1970, until May
1, 1971. The Corporation is declared in Section 804 to be a mixed
corporation under the Government Corporation Control Act."0
The Act bears the marks of last-minute patchwork and compro-
mise, and a more definitive analysis must await experience with its
administration and resolution of some of the litigation which it has in-
spired.
III. EXPERIENCE UNDER THE ACT
On October 30, 1970, the long decline in the number of passenger
trains in the United States was temporarily arrested. All pending dis-
continuance petitions before the Interstate Commerce Commission and
state regulatory commissions were dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
One month later, Secretary Volpe released his report outlining the
57 Supra n.3 0 , at 337.
58 The amount requested by the Nixon administration for continuing work on the ill-
fated prototype SST for one year was $289,000,000.
59 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1339, § 801 (1970).
60 31 U.S.C. § 856 et seq. (1970).
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basic system. In determining the basic system, the Transportation De-
partment proceeded on the following assumptions:
-Improving the quality of service is essential to reverse ridership
trends. Available funds should be concentrated on a limited number
of routes which show some promise of profitability so that improve-
ments can be made.
-In selecting routes, the emphasis should be on realistic projection of
future demands and costs.
-Even though funds should be concentrated on a limited number of
routes, route selection should provide a basic system on which service
can be added if response is favorable.6'
A selection of end points for routes followed, based on eight general
criteria: the nation's total transportation needs, demand, and cost; capa-
bility of being integrated into a national system; population (estimated
SMSA population of 1,000,000 or more); profitability; corporate flexi-
bility; and minimum of capital improvements required.62
Service characteristics were required to be identified by the Secre-
tary of Transportation." In designing the standards of service, the
Secretary stated that his intention was to preserve the discretion of
NRPC to expand rail passenger service as rapidly as the Corporation
develops a market strategy, gains experience, and shows routes to be
justified on the basis of public demand. The Secretary included the
following provisions:
(1) Private-room sleeping car service shall be provided for all sched-
ules having an overnight journey of at least six hours during the time
period from Midnight to 8:00 a.m.
(2) Food service shall be provided on all schedules operating between
the hours of 7:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m. and exceeding two hours trip time.
(3) Non-revenue lounge space shall be provided on all schedules in
excess of six hours duration.
(4) Parlor car or other first class accommodations may be provided
wherever justifiable by market demand.64




61 J. Volpe, Preliminary Report on Basic National Rail Passenger System 3 (1970).
62 Id. at 4.
63 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1329, § 201 (1970).















The Act required the Secretary to "consider the need for such
service within the states of Alaska and Hawaii and the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico." 66 Volpe replied as follows:
No end points were designated in the States of Alaska and Hawaii or
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. In Alaska, the Alaska Railroad pro-
vides a level of service consistent with demand. 67 Daily roundtrip ser-
vice is operated between Anchorage and Fairbanks and twice weekly
round-trip service is operated during winter months. Hawaii and Puerto
Rico do not have the facilities or demand which would support institu-
tion of intercity rail passenger service.88
From the preliminary report, three factors were evident. First, no
services were designated that were not currently operated by the rail-
roads. No new services were to be introduced. Second, the route struc-
ture seems to show a preference for the nearly-vanished "nostalgia," or
long-haul market over the short-haul "corridor" routes. Only the first
six routes fall into the latter category. This fact seems to be a change
from previous Department policy which had seen more potential in such
omitted routes as Chicago-Milwaukee, Cleveland-Cincinnati, St. Louis-
Kansas City, Los Angeles-San Diego, and Dallas-Houston. 9
Third, the proposed network provided little service between cities
in the West. The only trains operating west of the Mississippi were the
trains from Chicago to Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Hous-
ton. The Administration may have been influenced by a study made by
65 Id. at 7-29.
66 Pub. L. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1329, 45 U.S.C. § 521 (1970).
67 The Alaska Railroad is a nationalized carrier operated by the Department of Trans-
portation's Federal Railroad Administration. By this statement, Volpe decided that the Alaska
Railroad would not participate in NRPC. Alaska is also served by the White Pass & Yukon,
a Canadian railroad into Skagway.
68 Supra n.61, at 8.
69 Wall St. J., Nov. 3, 1970, at 3, col. 1.
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the Stanford Research Institute for the Southern Pacific Co. in 1966,
which predicted a poor future for intercity rail passenger service in the
Far West.7" One train could serve all these points, starting at Chicago,
with the Houston section splitting off at Kansas City, the Seattle section
at Green River, Wyoming, and the remaining San Francisco and Los
Angeles sections dividing at Ogden, Utah. Additional routes between
New Orleans and Los Angeles and between Seattle and San Diego had
been recommended by Volpe privately, but were deleted by the Office
of Management and Budget.7
In December, President Nixon nominated eight incorporators to
serve a 180-day term. The incorporators were approved by a voice vote
of the Congress on December 30, 1970, as was the 15-man advisory
financial panel.
During the month of December, interested parties and the Inter-
state Commerce Commission filed their replies to the basic system pro-
posed by the Secretary of Transportation. Fifteen railroads, forty-three
states, and several affected cities and regions produced their own indi-
vidual proposals, mostly geared to specific new routes or required
routings over favored routes between given end points.72
On January 28, 1971, Secretary Volpe released his final report.
The Secretary claimed that he lacked authority to include Canadian or
Mexican points within the basic system, since such service could be
provided only with the consent of Canadian or Mexican authorities."
The report concluded:
Several service points have been added to the basic system in response
to these suggestions despite some remaining questions on the profit-
ability of this additional service which led to their exclusion in the
Preliminary Report 74
This additional service included the following routes:
70 E. Brandes and A. Lazar, Rail Passenger Traffic in the West (SRI Project 5676,
1966).
7 Wall St. J., Jan. 29, 1971, at 3, col. 3. The Southern Pacific had launched a major
lobbying effort to keep the New Orleans-Los Angeles and Portland-Los Angeles segments
out of the basic system, since the difference between retention and elimination of the routes
was a matter of at least $5,000,000 in immediate obligations to the railroad. See N.Y. Times,
Jan. 25, 1971, at 1, col. 1.
72 J. Volpe, Final Report on Basic National Rail Passenger System I-8 (1971).








In addition, the Miami routes were expanded to include Tampa-St.
Petersburg as an additional end point "because it is an integral part
of the rail travel pattern to Florida from northern points."7
Chicago-Seattle trains were required to run via the Twin Cities,76
Chicago-San Francisco trains via Denver,77 and Chicago-Los Angeles
trains via Kansas City."
On March 22, 1971, the NRPC made its final decisions, which can
be summarized as follows: 184 trains were to operate, of which four
would run tri-weekly, the rest daily. Such a system would serve eighty-
five percent of our urban population. This plan effectively reduced by
over fifty percent the number of trains operating in October, 1970-April,
1971.
Contracts were offered to twenty-two railroads.79 Certain railroads,
such as the state-owned Long Island Rail Road and the federally-owned
Alaska Railroad, were not offered contracts and did not participate.
None of the short lines requested or were offered contracts, nor were
the United States portions of Canadian operations. The Georgia Rail-
road elected to continue its Augusta-Atlanta train and branchline mixed
trains for fear that its tax status might be affected. The Reading and
the South Shore operated service between Philadelphia and Newark,
and Chicago and South Bend, respectively; but as the distance involved
was only 90 miles, they considered these runs to be commuter opera-
tions and thus were not interested in participating. None of these rail-
roads were offered a contract by NRPC. s°
75 Id.
76 Id. at 11-50.
77 Id. at 11-54.
78 Id. at H-58.
79 Sixteen of the participating lines declined to accept stock in the new corporation,
taking a tax deduction for the calendar year 1970 in lieu of common stock. The four rail-
roads which accepted the stock are the Burlington Northern; the Chicago, Milwaukee, St.
Paul & Pacific; the Penn Central; and the Grand Trunk Western. The latter is a wholly
owned subsidiary of the Canadian National Railways, which is in turn owned completely by
the Canadian government. Thus, although the United States Government has no equity or
ownership in AMTRAK, the Canadian government indirectly controls a large percentage of
the system.
80 Trains 10 (August 1971).
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Shortly before contracts were offered, the Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railroad decided that it wanted no part of the new system. The
Rock Island had made several attempts to improve the image of its
passenger service. These efforts were successful for its Chicago sub-
urban trains, but did not help its intercity service. Thus, the company,
faced with removal of mail from its remaining passenger trains, began
a retrenchment program in 1967, and at the same time tried to upgrade
the remaining trains with luxury cars off the vanished limiteds. This
program was moderately successful in reducing losses and retaining a
good deal of patronage. By the cut-off date of October 30, 1970, the
Rock Island operated only four intercity trains, all within the state of
Illinois. However, the fee for joining the National Railroad Passenger
Corporation was based on 1969 losses. At that time, the railroad was
also operating a Chicago-Omaha and a Minneapolis-Kansas City train,
with resulting losses of $9,000,000 for the year. With the remaining
trains, the total projected loss was estimated at no more than $1,000,000
per year. The minimum cost of joining NRPC was about $4,700,000.
In addition, no savings on fixed facilities would occur by abandoning
passenger service except for one agent's position at Rock Island,
Illinois."
The Corporation's route decisions involved the immediate discon-
tinuance of over half the passenger routes then operated, reduction of
New York-Chicago service to one train daily, and the elimination of
any service whatsoever to Cleveland and Toledo, Ohio. Resentment in
the press and in Congress was acute.
On April 20, 1971, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
dropped the "Railpax" nickname in favor of "AMTRAK," an amalgam
for "American track." The new term was coined by a consulting firm
that found the word "Railpax" not only had limited consumer recall
but might also be sued for infringement of copyright by a company
that had registered "Railpak" as a trade name for a waste disposal
82system.
AMTRAK had a new name but was missing four important mem-
bers. As shown previously, the Georgia Railroad and Chicago, Rock
81 Interview with M. H. Bonesteel, Director of Passenger Service, C.R.I. & P.R.R.,
Chicago, July 9, 1971.
82 Wall St. J., April 20, 1971, at 24, col. 1.
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Island & Pacific Railroad, both marginal intercity carriers, had decided
it was more economical to cope with their manageable passenger deficits
than to join the new program. On April 21, 1971, the Southern Railway
(and its subsidiary Alabama Great Southern) refused to contract with
the AMTRAK system. However, the Central of Georgia, a subsidiary
of Southern, had joined. Southern issued a statement promising coop-
eration "in every feasible way" with AMTRAK in coordinating sched-
ules and service. 3 Since 1969, Southern had reduced its fleet of trains
to eight, and had a manageable passenger deficit. Furthermore, under
the guidance of its current president, the railroad had viewed its pas-
senger trains as a vital part of its public relations program, had re-
furbished its remaining trains, and had even gone to the extent of
purchasing two steam engines to haul passenger excursions. None of
these publicity benefits would inure to Southern were the trains to op-
erate under the AMTRAK aegis. In addition, the entrance fee for
AMTRAK was considered to be overly high in comparison to possible
savings from discontinuing the remaining trains. As a result, AMTRAK
did not have to dissipate any of its resources in the New York-New
Orleans market.
The Denver and Rio Grande Western operated two sets of trains:
the tri-weekly remnant of the old "California Zephyr" between Denver
and Ogden, and a rather profitable narrow-gauge tourist operation be-
tween Durango and Silverton, Colorado. Its passenger deficit for 1969
was much higher, due to the fact that the "Zephyr" then operated daily,
and the amount called for in its AMTRAK contract would be substan-
tially higher than the costs of continuing to run its "Rio Grande Zephyr"
on a tri-weekly coach-only basis. In an interview, the president of the
Rio Grande said, "Our trouble is we have to compete with Union Pacific
which is a flat country double-track mainline railroad. We have a single
track mountain line." Of course, the Rio Grande must run its "Zephyr"
over the route in question. But since it is an independent operation, the
railroad can shunt it onto sidings to permit freight trains to pass. In
view of this situation, the Rio Grande opted out of the system on April
26, 1971.4 Therefore, the net effect of these new arrangements was to
increase the number of intercity trains scheduled for operation in the
period 1971-1973, because these four holdout roads operated 18 trains,
in addition to the 184 trains saved by AMTRAK.
83 Wall St. J., April 22, 1971, at 4, col. 1.
84 News from National Association of Railroad Passengers (May 1971).
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The contracts arranged between AMTRAK and the 20 participat-
ing railroads provided for reimbursement to the railroads solely for
related costs, plus the reasonable value of terminal services required,
plus 5 percent to cover additional but unidentifiable costs and to repre-
sent the railroads' assumption of all damage and tort liability for the
passenger train service. This provision meant that AMTRAK would pay
the railroads about $200,000,000 in 1970." The contract provision con-
cerning service standards reads as follows:
Railroad shall provide services hereunder in an economic and efficient
manner and shall give appropriate recognition to the importance of
on-time passenger train operations and passenger comfort and conveni-
ence. Railroad shall make every reasonable effort to maintain the sched-
ules established by NRPC for its Intercity Rail Passenger Service.8 6
No penalties were provided for nonperformance, as compared to
the contract between the Transportation Department and Penn Central
for "Metroliner" operation which provides $1,000 per violation. The
AMTRAK contracts appear to rest solely on the good faith of the par-
ticipating railroads. s7
The birth of the new national passenger rail system was hardly an
auspicious occasion. Objections were heard in the courts and in Con-
gress. Several suits were filed to halt the May 1 starting date of the new
Corporation, protesting labor agreements, adequacy of notice, and the
discontinuance of certain trains which were claimed to be for com-
muters. None of these suits succeeded, all being dismissed for want of
standing. Judge Howard F. Corcoran of the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia stated that as far as he was aware "there
is no indication in the legislative history that Congress intended the
Secretary of Labor's certification of the Rail Passenger Service Act to
be reviewable by the court on its merits."88 In another proceeding, Judge
Corcoran stated that "Clearly in a non-labor agreement dispute, only
the Attorney-General can bring suit for violation of the act." 9
The constitutionality of the Act was also questioned. One such
question touches upon the propriety of requiring a private corporation
to make large payments to another corporation in order to be relieved
85 Railway Age 11 (Apr. 26, 1971).
86 Supra n.84, at 1.
87 Letter from Rep. Harley 0. Staggers and Sen. Warren G. Magnuson to Roger Lewis,
President of AMTRAK, May 12, 1971.
88 Chicago Today, Apr. 30, 1971, at 4, col. 1.
89 Id.
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of an uneconomic service requirement. The penalty for non-participa-
tion is continuance of service until 1975, regardless of public need,
which raises questions of confiscation. However, the precedents for
"mixed" governmental-private enterprise consortia are too well-estab-
lished for this particular issue to impede AMTRAK.
A three-judge district court in Illinois has declared the Act con-
stitutional holding that it was a rational attempt to preserve and revital-
ize seriously declining passenger service, which did not deny substantive
due process to railroads or affected users of the service."0
Since May 1, 1971, AMTRAK has added service between Boston-
New York-Washington, Chicago-Milwaukee-Minneapolis, on an alternate
route between Minneapolis and Spokane, between Chicago and Indian-
apolis, between Washington and Parkersburg, W.Va., between Chicago
and Boston via Cincinnati, and between Milwaukee and St. Louis via
Chicago. In addition, pledges of financial support from the states of
Massachusetts and Illinois has caused service to be restored under the
"put up or shut up" provision9' between Boston and Springfield, Mass.,
and Chicago and West Quincy, Mo., respectively.
On May 10, 1971, AMTRAK, relying on the good faith of politi-
cal leaders from New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois,
instituted through service from New York to Chicago on the "Lake
Shore" route via Buffalo, Cleveland and Toledo. The train had never
really been improved and AMTRAK operated freshly-scrubbed equip-
ment under old work rules, through old stations, with old fares, little
advertising and a nearly useless reservation system. Although AMTRAK
claimed it lost $3.6 million on the run, it failed to supply state officials
with audited bills accounting for the costs, which were paid directly by
the railroad.92 Cleveland's Union Terminal now remains the costliest
and most elaborate subway station this side of Moscow, as the Corpo-
ration has ceased all service to that city of over two million residents. 3
To make matters worse, apparently the agreements entered into with the
states were not binding, and the Corporation will not be compensated
90 Quincy College & Seminary Corporation v. Burlington Northern Inc., 328 F. Supp.
808 (1971).
91 Pub. L. No. 91-518, 84 Stat. 1336, § 403(b) (1970).
92 News from National Association of Railroad Passengers (Jan. 1972).
93 Thorns, Exit the Lake Shore, Transport Central (Jan. 17, 1972) reprinted in Trains
(Apr. 1972).
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for the service. The last "Lake Shore Limited" ran on January 5, 1972,
without the,necessity of obtaining authorization for discontinuance from
any government agency.
The Cleveland example points out a fundamental inequity in the
AMTRAK legislation-that which some cities get free, other commu-
nities must pay for. Perhaps this inequity is inherent in any governmen-
tal decision to place facilities, but the two-thirds matching requirement
seems to this writer a bit high, at least for smaller states.
The cost of entry into AMTRAK is based on the railroad's 1969
loss-which in many cases is unrealistic. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission Chairman George M. Stafford has written:
If the carrier is to pay an amount hinged to its 1969 passenger deficit
under the specified formula, the larger the deficit, the more the carrier
must pay. Though entry into Railpax may well be selected by a deficit
carrier as the lesser of two evils, that does not cure the lack of equity
in this concept. The carrief that has borne the greatest burden of pro-
viding a public service could be required to pay the highest price for
relief.94
Commissioner Stafford also pointed out that if a railroad showed a
profit on passenger operations in 1969, it would have no way of getting
into the Corporation, even if each year thereafter it should show a hope-
less loss on the operation. 5 Similarly, the burden is not equally dis-
tributed among all railroads. Lines which had dropped passenger service
before October, 1970 need pay nothing whatsoever to the new Corpora-
tion.
But a more fundamental defect of the legislation was Congress'
insistence that AMTRAK operate on a for-profit basis. This writer sug-
gests that the more realistic approach would be for AMTRAK to be
established as a public, tax-exempt corporation with a clear mandate
to establish modern passenger routes on an expanded system. The semi-
private form of organization chosen is at best a hybrid, and at worst
merely a vehicle by which the railroads can effect massive discontinu-
ance on an unprecedented scale. In view of the traditional deficits in-
curred in this business, and AMTRAK's apparent inability to quickly
change marketing methods, the financial outlook for the Corporation
does not look bright.
94 Letter from George M. Stafford, ICC Chairman, to Wilfred Rommel, Ass't Dir. for
Legislative Reference, Bureau of the Budget, Feb. 3, 1970.
95 Id.
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AMTRAK has not, during its brief existence, attempted to operate
its own trains with its own personnel, but has instead chosen to rely
upon contracts with the railroads. The result has been the immediate
freeing of railroads from the passenger deficit. AMTRAK has also
created a type of cost-plus subsidy, with no incentive to the operating
railroad to improve services or control costs. The results are generally
what one would expect. As of February, 1972:
-Equipment obtained from various lines is not compatible with other
cars on the same train.
-The January timetable is still not distributed and is already inaccu-
rate.
-No uniform fare policy has been established, and some fares are
higher than analogous air rates.
-The logical market for AMTRAK--distances within 400 miles-has
not been effectively exploited.
-No changes have been made in labor agreements determining crew
consists for passenger trains, although some modification has been
made in freight agreements by the various railroads.
-AMTRAK hires hostesses who cannot serve drinks or usurp porters'
duties, but are paid $600 a month, plus free meals and accommodations
while enroute.
-No on-the-scene AMTRAK supervisors exist at such key terminals as
Chicago that have decision-making authority and everything must be
cleared from Washington."6
In October, 1971, the National Railroad Passenger Corporation
sought further appropriations from Congress of $170,000,000 to cover
increased operating expenses. Many observers felt that this amount
would not be enough to provide for the upgrading of service necessary
to attract riders back to the rails. The appropriation is now pending in
Congress. 7
The Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970 signifies a departure from
the concept of taxation by regulation of the transportation industry that
began in the nineteenth century. The experience of the next two years
should demonstrate whether a demand for rail passenger service still
exists or can be rekindled, and whether it is worth the effort. However,
without adequate funding, independence, or initiative, the trial may
prove to be a sham, and AMTRAK may be derailed for good in 1973.
96 Shepard, Amtrak Rolls Along-Slowly, Chicago Today, Feb. 20, 1972, at 21, col. 1.
97 See generally Hearing before the Subcommittee on Surface Transportation of the
United States Senate on the Administration's Request for Additional Funding for AMTRAK,
91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 26, 1971) Ser. No. 92-29.
